

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

PFIAB Request

PFIAB/NSC Review Completed.

FROM:

Walter Elder
Executive Secretary, NFIB

EXTENSION

NO.

IC/82/3312

DATE

21 January 1982

25X1

STAT

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across columns after each comment.)

1. Executive Director, CIA
Room 7E12
CIA Hqs.

25 JAN 1982

JMM

3. Please take care of this & let me know when it's done. Thank you.

If you can take care of this -

Pls do + tell Elder

J

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NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

82-2170

IC/82/3311
21 January 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM : Walter Elder
Executive Secretary

SUBJECT : PFIAB Request: National Intelligence Estimates (1981)

1. Fred Demech requests a copy of each of the estimates listed in the attachment.

2. For the record, please, drop me a note when you've dealt with this request.

[Redacted Signature Box]

WALTER ELDER

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cc: Executive Director, CIA

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DERIVATIVE CL BY SIGNER
☒ DECL ☒ REVW ON January 1987
DERIVED FROM NFIB-9.1/36

B204

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES (1981)

The Senior Review Panel (comprised of [redacted] William Leonhart, [redacted] was asked to compare National Intelligence Estimates during the first three quarters of 1981 with those during 1979 and 1980 in relevance, tempo and quality. They reported that in 1979-80 there was substantially less use of the Community and a dearth of interagency estimates directly pointed to critical policy issues in the manner followed since the late spring of this year under revised NIC procedures. Timeliness of intelligence advice and rapidity of response time has much improved in 1981. Design of analysis/estimates--in content shaped more closely to specific policy problems and in forms more useful to policymakers--has also been significantly enhanced.

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Finally, in 1979-80, there was substantial evidence of capacity for pertinent anticipatory analysis going unused because of insufficient linkage between the policy and the intelligence communities. Some of these cases later developed into major policy issues involving instability in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Central America. Our impression is that, in 1981, performance in converting perceptive basic studies in NFAC into effective inputs for policymakers has been materially improved.

50 KEY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES (March 1981-January 15, 1982)

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